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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in the Third District 
Court with the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of 
the first degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on an information alleging 
that he robbed Brenda Bradley and Barbara Harris, and in so 
doing, used a deadly weapon or a facsimile thereof, to-wit: 
a revolver, on January 8, 1976. A jury returned a verdict 
of guilty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this Court 
reversing the verdict of the trial court and granting 
appellant a new trial. Respondent urges that the trial 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
Brenda Bradley testified that in the afternoon 
of June 30, 1975, she and three of her children, ages 
six to fifteen, visited at the residence of a friend, 
Barbara Harris, located at 114 4 South Second East in 
Salt Lake City (T.16,17). Also present in the duplex 
that afternoon were, according to several testimonies, 
Barbara Harris and her three young children, Pat and 
Ship Timms and their two children, Debby Harris, and 
Willy Harris (T.18,22). Ms. Bradley testified that 
she and Barbara Harris were preparing to drive to the 
Utah State Prison to visit Ms.. Harris1 husband 
and Ms. Bradley's fiance (T.18). Because Ms. Harris 
had planned to try to buy a car that same day, Ms. 
Bradley further testified that she had brought with 
her $138.00, all of which she was amenable to lending 
Barbara, so that the purchase could be made (T.53). 
According to Ms. Bradley, between three and four 
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o'clock a man she knew only by the nickname "Littleman" 
entered her home without knocking, accompanied by a second 
man, whom she knew to be named Edwin (T.21,22). Ms. 
Bradley proceeded to make an in-court identification of 
appellant and testified that she had identified "Littleman" 
as Kenneth Wells from police photographs (T.20,69). 
Ms. Bradley continued her testimony, stating 
that both appellant and Wells held drawn guns and Wells 
demanded money (T.22). The victim testified that her 
$138.00 was taken from her purse, along with other items, 
including some traveler's checks, that appellant entered 
Barbara's bedroom and reappeared holding some cash, which 
he gave to Wells (T.25,46). Wells also took money from 
Ship Timms (T.26), and struck both Willy Harris and Ship 
(T.27,28). Before leaving, Wells cut the telephone wires 
(T.62); the two men drove away in the car Willy Harris 
had been using, Wells having taken the car keys from 
Willy (T.27,28). 
Ms. Bradley completed direct examination by 
testifying that immediately following the robbery she 
and Barbara Harris went over to Ms. Bradley's house to 
calm down the frightened children and to have an older 
child babysit their children while they visited 
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Ms. Harris1 husband and Ms. Bradley's fiance at the 
Utah State Prison. She noted that they did not take 
time to call the police until later that evening because 
they did not want to miss the visiting period at the 
Prison (T.30). 
The State next called Kenneth Timms, who, 
with his wife, had been a guest at the Harris home in 
the afternoon of June 30, 1975, and who previously 
had been an adult foster care family for Ms. Harris 
(T.72-75). Timms made an in-court identification of 
appellant as one of two black men who invaded the 
Harris home shortly after the Timmsf arrival and robbed 
the persons present (T.76-77). Although Timms1 
testimony was that appellant did not have a gun in his 
possession when he arrived, he did state that appellant 
went into a bedroom and returned with a »22 caliber 
revolver which Timms had hidden under a pillow, Timms 
having earlier testified that he had brought the revolver 
to show Ms. Harris, and had hidden it in the bedroom so the 
children would not get it (T.79,85). The witness then 
testified that he had been struck in the head by the 
second man, who cut the telephone wires and who took 
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money ($2*00) and car keys from Timms, in addition to the 
revolver taken by appellant (T.81,82). 
Patricia Timms and Barbara testified in 
substantially the same manner as the other witnesses 
although Ms. Timms testified that appellant initially 
had no gun while Ms. Harris testified*that appellant was 
carrying a gun when he entered her home (T.114,135). 
Detective Thomas Baron of the Tucson, Arizona, 
Police Department, testified that on July 17, 1975, a 
vehicle driven by Kenneth Wells was stopped by police 
officers and that he had removed a revolver from the 
area beneath the dashboard (T.273-275). Afterwards, 
both Wells and appellant, who was in a nearby motel, 
were taken into custody (T.273). Edward Berry of the 
Utah Motor Vehicle Department testified that the vehicle 
in question was registered to Edward Wells (T.279), and 
Kenneth Timms stated that that revolver looked like his 
revolver which had been taken during the robbery.(T.281). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf. He 
stated that he had gone to the Harris residence to 
purchase heroin; that the heroin they purchased there 
the afternoon of June 30, 197 5, was not good? that Ms. Harris 
refused to give him back his purchase money, and that as he 
and Kenneth Wells left, he grabbed a plastic bag with 
several balloons of heroin in it and fled, a few days 
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later leaving the Salt Lake City area for Tucson, 
Arizona (T.216-234). Testifying in substantially the 
same manner was Kenneth Wells, who further stated 
that neither man took a gun into the house (T.198). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE A BILL OF PARTICULARS NEED NOT 
REVEAL THE PROSECUTION'S ENTIRE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY RECEIVED EVIDENCE NEITHER NAMED NOR DESCRIBED 
IN THE INFORMATION OR BILL, 
According to Utah Code Amu § 77-21-9 (1953), 
as amended, a Bill of Particulars may be demanded by a 
criminal defendant if the information or indictment 
"fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of 
the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prepare his 
defense. • . ." In the Bill provided by David Yocum, 
a Deputy County Attorney for Salt Lake County (R.369-370), 
the names and known addresses of all witnesses, including 
those who would not be called to testify, were given. 
The Bill also stated the time and place of the alleged 
armed robbery: approximately 4-4:30 p.m., June 30, 1975, 
at 1144 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Finally, 
the Bill named the entrance into that residence and the 
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robbing of Barbara Harris and Brenda Moore Bradley of 
specific sums of money by use of a revolver as the 
acts which the State contended appellant did, along with 
one Kenneth Wells* Respondent contends that this detailed 
information provided appellant with sufficient particularity 
of the charges against him to enable appellant to prepare 
his defense. The omission of information about other monies 
and items taken by appellant was proper as that evidence 
was a vital part of the proof of the armed robbery of Ms. 
Bradley and Ms. Harris, exempting it from disclosure, 
requirements since appellant was not charged with robbery 
of Mr. and Mrs. Timms or either of the Harrises. As 
appellant's defense was a total denial of the robbery 
charges coupled with an admission of theft of heroin at 
that residence, his defense could not have been unfairly 
prejudiced by the non-disclosure of this evidence, and 
in factr appellant has been unable to demonstrate any 
prejudice resulting from the non-disclosure. Counsel 
merely cries "foul" at the "surprise," being unable to 
articulate the difference that such information would 
have made in preparation of his defence* If anyone knew 
about the taking of Timms1 revolver, surely it was 
appellant himself. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has considered the 
contents of Bills of Particulars on several occasions 
and has consistently held valid Bills whose contents were 
comparable to the instant one* In State v. Lack, 118 
Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950), the defendant demanded 
copies of invoice sheets, ledgers, and other business 
records. This Court held: 
". . • Sec. 105-21-9(1) 
U.C.A. 1943, was designed to enable 
a defendant to have stated the 
particulars of the charge which 
he must meet, where the short form 
indictment or information is used. 
It was not intended as a device to 
compel the prosecution to give an 
accused person a preview of the 
evidence on which the state relies 
to sustain the charge." Id. at 855. 
In State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173 
(1943), cited by appellant for another proposition, the 
defendant in a carnal knowledge case wanted the exact time 
of the incident, whether it was in or out of the car, 
what other person was present, etc. The Bill provided, 
in pertinent parts 
"On or about the 1st day of 
September, A.D. 1940, at or near 
the mouth of Hobble Creek Canyon in 
Utah County, State of Utah, the 
defendant Dewey Jameson, had 
carnal knowledge of and sexual 
intercourse with the body of M.N. 
. . . ." Id. at 175. 
The Court held that it was not error to refuse defendant's 
requests as the Bill provided defendant sufficiently 
informed him of the nature of the offense and the time and 
place of its commission. 
The United States Supreme Court considered this 
issue in Wong Tai v. United Statesr 273 U.S. 77, 71 L.Ed. 
545 (1927), when a defendant's request for a Bill of 
Particulars was denied because he wanted a recitation of 
all of the overt acts the government contended defendant 
had performed. The Court observed, in holding the denial 
proper, that defendant in effect sought a complete discovery 
of the government's case in reference to the overt acts and 
that there was no evidence that defendant's substantial 
rights were prejudiced in any way. Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that the granting of a motion for a Bill of 
Particulars is within the sound discretion of the court and 
if no abuse is shown, the decision of the trial court will 
not be disturbed. 
Respondent asserts that in the instant case 
appellant was provided with ample information with which to 
meet the charges and construct a defense as the omitted 
information was merely evidence to substantiate and support 
the armed robbery charges. No attempt was ever made by the 
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prosecution to expand the information to include these 
additional robbery charges. 
Finally, even if, arguendo, the trial court 
had ordered the prosecution to supply this information, 
even though not statutorily required, the court could 
have excused the failure to provide such material by 
permitting the evidence to be introduced. See State v. 
Morraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 (1970). Because 
the trial court in the instant case never required an 
amendment of the Bill or indicated that it was excusing 
any failure on the State's part in providing information, 
the necessary conclusion is that the trial court considered 
the Bill sufficient. As no abuse of the court's discre-
tion in so finding appears in the record, respondent 
submits that that finding should remain undisturbed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW 
DEFENSE COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE MS. BRADLEY REGARDING 
HER ALLEGED USE OF HEROIN ON THE DAY OF THE ROBBERY. 
During defense counsel1s cross-examination 
of Brenda Bradley, he posed the following question: 
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"On June 30, 1975, when this incident occurred, had 
you used any heroin?" The prosecution objected; the 
court sustained* Appellant claims that under Rule 20 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the court should have 
overruled the objection, as the answer may have 
affected her credibility. 
There are two related flaws in that analysis. 
The initial flaw is that it is mere speculation on 
defense counsel's part that the use of heroin by Ms. 
Bradley would have distorted her perceptions of that 
day. Indeed, there was no testimony by any witness 
remotely suggesting that on the day of the robbery, 
Ms. Bradley was exhibiting abnormal speech or behavior. 
Secondly, and most importantly, Rule 20 is 
subject to the strictures of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Even if defense counsel could demonstrate 
some relevancy of that information to the issue of 
her credibility, if the relevancy of that information 
is outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect, the 
evidence, otherwise admissible, can be excluded by the 
court, for Rule 45 states in pertinent part: 
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" . . . the judge may in his 
discretion exclude evidence if 
he finds that its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the 
risk that its admission will . . . 
(b) create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice or of confusing 
the issues or of misleading the 
jury. . . . " 
The note following the rule observes that this rule 
applies in situations where collateral issues which 
have only slight probative value but create illegitmate 
emotional appeal are injected into the proceedings. 
Respondent submits that on this basis the objection 
was properly sustained. 
Had Ms. Bradley responded that she had used 
heroin on the day in question, there is a strong 
likelihood that some jurors would, on that basis alone, 
have discredited her entire testimony because of 
sleazy connotations of "hype" and "junkie" invoked 
by the revelation that one is a heroin user. Certainly 
heroin users can be the victims of armed robberies, 
and in this instance, the court properly refused to 
allow questions whose thrust was to discredit a witness 
on inappropriate and highly prejudicial grounds by 
holding her out to the jury as an unreliable drug user. 
Respondent suggests that any probative value based on 
-12-
Ms, Bradley's perceptions of the robbery events was 
minimal because three subsequent prosecution witnesses 
gave substantially the same descriptions of the events 
that occurred during the robbery, suggesting that her 
memory and perceptions of that day were as clear as the 
others, none of whom was asked if he had used heroin. 
State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 1975), is 
relied upon by appellant. That case can be easily 
distinguished for the issue there was the appropriateness 
of asking a defendant in a theft case if she was under 
the influence of drugs at the time of her testimony. 
That is an entirely different issue from the one this 
case presents, for intoxication during testimony could 
well affect coherency, speech, thought, etc., with the 
elicited testimony perhaps being rambling, disjointed, 
or even unintelligible. Therefore, the issue was witness 
competency, not credibility. 
On these bases, the trial court properly 
refused to allow defense counsel to ask Ms. Bradley 
about her alleged drug use. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A 
MISTRIAL, NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT HAVING OCCURRED. 
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Appellant relies principally on State v, 
Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 383 P.2d 407 (1963), and State 
v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), in 
his claim that he is due a new trial because of 
prosecutorial misconduct in the corss-examination of 
appellant and Kenneth Wells, Respondent, however, 
submits that those cases are distinguishable on 
their facts and that the record contains no support 
for appellant's allegation that the only purpose for 
such cross-examination was to "disgrace the defendant 
or show his propensity to commit crime," 
In Kazda, supra, a third party was allowed 
to testify about admission of other crimes that the 
defendant had made, even though defendant's commission 
of those crimes was as yet unproven. This Court properly 
held such in-depth examination of a third party to be 
prejudicial error as the clear intent of that interroga-
tion was to demonstrate defendant's proclivity to 
commit crimes* 
In Dickson, supra, where the cross-examination 
of the defendant included the probing of a robbery that 
had occurred in Texas subsequent to the robbery in 
Salt Lake City with which the defendant was charged, the 
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Utah Supreme Court determined that the only fact adduced 
from that cross-examination was that the witness had been 
charged with such a crime and held once again that "such 
evidence is not admissible if its effect is merely to 
disgrace the defendant or show his propensity to commit 
crime." Id. at 412. 
In the instant case the prosecution attempted 
no in-depth pursuit of information concerning the Tucson 
robbery charge (later dismissed) against Mr. Wells, Since 
Wells had previously testified that he and appellant had 
left the jurisdiction and were subsequently picked up by 
the police in Tucson, Arizona (T.202-204), it was relevant 
to inquire about how he came to return to Utah (arrested 
on robbery charge, dismissed, extradited to Utah via 
fugitive warrant outstanding for probation violation) 
(T.206). Furthermore, two of the State's witnesses 
had testified that both appellant and Wells were carrying 
a gun when they entered the Second East residence. 
Therefore, an admission by Wells or appellant concerning 
possession of a revolver other than the .22 caliber pistol 
owned by Timms would have been helpful to the State. 
However, both Wells and appellant summarily denied 
knowledge or possession of a second gun (T.215,222), and 
the matter was dropped. 
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The scope of these cross-examinations was 
well within permissible limits* Questions related to 
Tucson activities were but a small part of extensive 
cross-examinations, whose main focus was a description 
of events that occurred during the robbery at the Harris 
home. The trial court maintained control of the 
proceedings and in some instances did sustain defense 
objections to improper prosecution questions. Appellant 
has been unable to demonstrate any prejudice resulting 
from prosecution questioning. With four eyewitnesses 
to the Salt Lake robbery testifying for the prosecution, 
creating a solid case against appellant, especially in 
light of the recovery from Wells1 car of the .22 caliber 
pistol belonging to eyewitness Timms, the county attorney 
would have been extremely foolhardy to have jeopardized 
such a strong case by intentionally using cross-examination 
for purposes that would have constituted reversible error 
on appeal. 
Respondent contends that because Kazda and 
Dickson do not settle this case, the appropriate rule is 
found in State v. Bellwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 
(1972); State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 
(1972); and Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 
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10 Utah 2d 69, 347 P.2d 862 (1959); all three cases 
concerning trial court discretion and cross-examination. 
In Bellwood, supra, Justice Tuckett, writing for the 
Court (with justices concurring and one concurring in 
the granting of a new trial)r stated that the scope of 
cross-examination of a defendant by a prosecutor is 
largely within the discretion of the trial court and 
that the Utah Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere 
unless there is abuse of discretion* The appellant in 
that case received a new trial because his cross-examination 
by the prosecutor went to his punishment, rather than h.s 
guilt or innocence. 
In Anderson, supra, this Court held that the 
extent, of cross-examind:ion is a matter which lies within 
the sound discretion of the trial judge, 3 rule discussed 
years earlier in Weber Basin, supra, where the Court 
observed that even though the trial judge generally has 
discretion to control cross-examination within reasonable 
limitations, "he should not so reject it as to prevent 
inquiry into matters having a direct bearing upon the 
vital issues." Id. at 865. 
Based on these considerations, respondent 
urges that this Court defer to the judgment of the trial 
court, no abuse of its discretion having been demonstrated. 
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POINT IV 
EVIDENCE BY WAY OF IMPEACHMENT IS IMPROPER 
ON A POINT NOT PROPERLY IN EVIDENCE. 
Appellant claims that his right to due 
process of law required that a former Salt Lake City 
Police Department undercover narcotics agent be 
allowed to testify that three months subsequent to the 
armed robbery he purchased heroin from Barbara Harris. 
He attempts to make the agentfs testimony sufficiently 
relevant by showing its inconsistency with the testimony 
of Ms. Harris, wherein she stated that she had never 
sold heroin. Appellant contends that the agent's 
testimony would prove Ms. Harris to be a liar, and as her 
credibility is an issue, such testimony ought to be 
received. 
Even if, arguendo, the agent testified exactly 
as expected, respondent submits that the testimony would 
still be inadmissible under a well recognized rule that 
a witness cannot be contradicted or impeached by facts 
collateral to the issue. English jurisprudence has long 
recognized the necessity for such a rule, the Earl of 
Castlemaine's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1081, 1107 
(1680), being but one early example. On an offer to 
contradict on a collateral matter, the following discourse 
occurred: 
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"Earl of Castlemaine's Trial, 
7 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1081, 1107 
(1680) (on an offer to contradict 
on a collateral matter): Attorney-
General; If he may ask questions 
about such foreign matters as this, 
no man can justify himself; . . . 
any man may be catched thus. 
Defendant; How can a man be 
catched in the truth? L.C^J. 
SCROGGS; We are not hearken to it. 
The reason is this, first; You must 
have him perjured, and we are not 
now to try whether that thing sworn 
in another place be true or false; 
because that is the way to accuse 
whom you please, and that may make a 
man a liar that cannot imagine this 
will be put to him; and so no man's 
testimony that comes to be a witness 
shall leave himself safe." 
A later English case, Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 
1. Exch. 91, 104 (1847), has been cited approvingly as providing 
the policy rationale for excluding contradictory testimony on 
a collateral issue; 
"ALDERSON, B., in Attorney-General 
v. Hitchcock, 1. Exch. 91, 104 (1847); 
When the question is not relevant, 
strictly speaking, to the issue, but 
tending to contradict the witness, 
his answer must be taken (although it 
tends to show that he in that particular 
instance speaks falsely, and although 
it is [thus] not altogether immaterial 
to the issue) for the sake of the general 
public convenience; for great inconvenience 
would follow from a continual course of 
those sorts of cross-examinations which 
would be let in the case of a witness 
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being called for the purpose of 
contradiction. ROLFE, B.: The 
laws of evidence on this subject, 
as to what ought and what ought not 
to be received, must be considered 
as founded on a sort of comparative 
consideration of the time to be 
occupied in examinations of this 
nature and the time which it is 
practicable to bestow upon them. 
If we lived for a thousand years, 
instead of about sixty or seventy, 
and every case were of sufficient 
importance, it might be possible and 
perhaps proper to throw a light on 
matters in which every possible question 
might be suggested, for the purpose of 
seeing by such means whether the whole 
was unfounded, or what portion of it was 
not, and to raise every possible inquiry 
as to the truth of the statements made. 
But I do not see how that could be; in 
fact, mankind find it to be impossible. 
Therefore some line must be drawn." 
Given this English birth and heritage, the 
established American rule in courts that have considered 
the matter is that American courts too will not receive 
such testimony into evidence. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court does not appear to have ever decided this exact 
point, several neighboring states have, and all have held 
inadmissible this kind of evidence. See: State v. Mundell, 
66 Idaho 298, 158 P,2d 818 (1945); Dewey v. Funk, 211 Kan. 
54, 505 P.2d 722 (1973); Banta v. Superior Court of Maricopa 
County, 112 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653 (1976); Holland v. Briggs, 
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532 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1975); and State v. Gardner, 16 Or. 
App. 464, 518 P.2d 1341, cert, denied 95 S.Ct. 313. 
As the general rule is conceded everywhere, 
the critical issue becomes whether the evidence sought 
to be introduced is collateral or material. State v. 
Johnson, 192 Wash. 467, 73 P.2d 1342 (1937), provides a 
test in its holding that the cross-examiner is bound 
by the response given by the witness: 
"A witness cannot be impeached 
by showing falsity of his testimony 
concerning facts collateral to the 
issue, but a party cross-examining 
a witness as to such matters is 
concluded by the answers given. . . 
Whether a matter is material or 
collateral . . . depends on whether 
the party cross-examining the witness 
is entitled to prove it in support of 
his case." rd. at 1344. 
In Wigmore's words, "could the fact, as to 
which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence 
for any purpose independently of the contradiction?" 
IIIA Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Revision), p. 961, 
§ 1003. 
Respondent contends that in the instant 
case it would be merely collateral as to whether Ms. 
Harris ever sold heroin and lied about having sold the 
narcotic. Appellant was charged with armed robbery 
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and whether the victim of that armed robbery had sold 
heroin and subsequently lied about it is immaterial. 
However, in a prosecution of Ms. Harris for selling 
narcotics, the undercover agent*s testimony would then 
become vital. At pages 248 and 249 of the transcript, 
counsel for appellant admitted that his only purpose 
in seeking to have the agent testify was to show that 
Ms. Harris had lied under oath about selling heroin. 
Respondent submits that this testimony 
would not pass the Wigmore, Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 
or State v. Johnson tests of materiality. Because the 
agent's testimony could not have been properly received 
during any other facet of the trial, the court properly 
ruled that it was inadmissible in this attempt to suggest 
that Ms. Harris had perjured herself. Ms. Harris was not 
on trial, and whether she was dishonest about selling 
drugs was an issue to be determined at her own trial, 
not appellant's. Additionally, a further policy reason 
to exclude this type of collateral contradictory testimony 
was the severe prejudicial effect such an allegation might 
have on the jury. Drug dealers are generally not held 
in high repute by the local citizenry, and leveling those 
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allegations at Ms. Harris may well have unfairly 
prejudiced the jury to disregard her entire testimony, 
believing that drug dealers—an accusation which has not 
been proven—deserve to have bad thing happen to them, 
including armed robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments contained herein, 
respondent urges the Court to affirm the verdict of 
the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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-23-
